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THREE NEW EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT AT
WILL DOCTRINE-Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn. 2d
219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company, ' the Washington Supreme
Court limited the employer's right to discharge at will employees by carv-
ing out three specific exceptions to the at will rule.2 This approach is a
tentative step toward protection of the interests of employees in Washing-
ton. However, because many unjustly discharged employees will be un-
able to frame a complaint that falls within one of these narrow exceptions,
the Thompson decision falls short of a comprehensive solution to the
problem of unfair discharge. 3
I. BACKGROUND
Early Washington decisions held that a hiring for an indefinite period
constituted a hiring at will and that such employment could be terminated
at the employer's discretion without resulting liability. 4 These holdings
were consistent with the classical contract theory of the late nineteenth
century, which was based on the assumption that individuals have com-
plete social freedom. 5 Unless the duration of the employment relationship
1. 102 Wn.2d219,685P.2d. 1081 (1984).
2. Id. at 228-32, 685 P.2d. at 1087-89. The common law rule that an employee hired for an
indefinite term is subject to termination at any time and for any reason is known as the "at will" rule.
For a comprehensive treatment of its development, see P. SELZNICK. LAW. SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JusTIcE 132-37 (1969); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
Hist. 118 (1976).
3. Estimates of the number of unjustifiable discharges occurring annually in.this country vary.
Professor Stieber of Michigan State University calculates that 50,000 to 100,000 of the non-union
employees discharged every year could get their jobs back if they had access to an impartial tribunal.
See The Employment-At-Will Issue, (Nov. 22, 1982) LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) vol. 111, No. 23, at 24.
Professor Peck of the University of Washington estimates that close to 300,000 discharge and disci-
pline cases in the non-unionized sector would have been negotiated in grievance procedures if they
had occurred within a collective bargaining relationship. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employ-
ment:A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1979).
4. See, e.g., Webster v. Schauble, 65 Wn. 2d 849, 852,400 P.2d 292,294 (1965) (in absence of
contract of employment for specified period, employer has right to discharge at any time with or
without cause); Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co., 46 Wn. 2d 408, 410, 281 P.2d 832, 833
(1955) (general or indefinite hiring is at will and either party may terminate at any time); Davidson v.
Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 149 Wash. 685, 688, 271 P. 878, 879 (1928) (citing H. WOOD. A
TREATrsE ON TRE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877), for the proposition that employ-
ment of indefinite duration could be terminated at will).
5. See Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Ter-
minate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1825 (1980).
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was specified, the employer was presumed to retain the right to terminate
at will. 6
The application of the at will rule to nineteenth and early twentieth
century employment relationships did not produce harsh results for two
reasons. First, an individual seldom maintained a long-term employment
relationship with any one employer. 7 Job security was not an expectation
in the mobile frontier society. Second, employment by another for wages
was not the chief source of economic security for most people of that era. 8
The family farm, which provided a back-up subsistence living, and the
extended family unit, which offered medical care as well as disability and
old age protection, made job security much less important. 9
With the demise of agrarian society and the extended family, job secu-
rity took on new significance. 10 As rigid application of the at will rule
began to produce inequitable results, I courts, armed with modem tort
and contract principles, modified the rule. 12
Two narrow exceptions to the at will rule were recognized in Washing-
ton prior to the Thompson case. 1 3 First, a contract for "permanent" or
"steady" employment, even though indefinite in duration, is terminable
6. Id. at 1825-26.
7. See Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern At Will Rule. 51
U.M.K.C. L. REV 189, 191 (1983).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 196.
11. Where the rule has been applied as a substantive limitation on contract formation, at will
employees have been unable to enforce even explicitly negotiated job termination restraints. See.
e.g., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775, 779 (Ind. App. 1975) (indefinite duration of em-
ployment agreement precluded cause of action for breach of express contract to limit employer's
power to discharge). Courts, relying on the at will doctrine, have also dismissed suits against employ-
ers who used the termination power to undermine public policy. See, e.g.. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire
Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (employee discharged for refusing to falsify medical records
denied remedy); Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App. 1934) (no cause of action where em-
ployee discharged for refusing to vote as instructed by eniployer).
For criticism of the rule, see generally Blades, Employlent at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Liniting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power. 67 COLuti L. REV 1404 (1967): DeGiuseppe.
The Effect of the Employment-at-will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits.
10 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. I (1981); Peck, supra note 3: Peirce. Mann & Roberts. Employee Termina-
tion At Will: A Principled Approach. 28 VILL L. REV 1 (1982); Summers. Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA_ L. REV 481 (1976) Comment. supra note 5:
Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee. 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1435
(1975); Note. Termination of the At Will Employee: The General Rule and the Wisconsin Rule. 65
MARQ. L. REV 637 (1982); Comment, Employment At Will: When Must an Employer Have Good
Cause for Discharging an Emnplo.yee?. 48 Mo. L. REV 113 (1983): Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN L. REV 335 (1974).
12. See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982).
13. An isolated case that recognized a policy exception is Krystad v. Lau. 65 Wn. 2d 827. 846.
400 P.2d 72, 83 (1965) (termination of at will employee for joining a union violated public policy and
provided basis for civil action).
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. Exceptions to the Employment At Will Doctrine
by the employer only for just cause, if there is an implied agreement to
that effect. 14 Second, the employer is limited to just cause for discharge
in situations where the employee has given consideration in addition to
contemplated services. 15
II. THE THOMPSON DECISION
Kenneth Thompson had worked for St. Regis Paper Company for sev-
enteen years when he was asked to resign because he had "stepped on
somebody's toes. ' 16 He sued St. Regis, alleging bad faith and violation
of the employment agreeement. 17 The trial court granted St. Regis' mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding that an implied contract had not been
created and that Mr. Thompson had not given any additional considera-
tion. 18
The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that the two
previously recognized exceptions to the at will rule did not apply. 19 Nev-
ertheless, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for St.
Regis, holding that there were material issues of fact with regard to three
additional exceptions. 20
First, the court held that an employee and employer may contractually
modify a terminable at will relationship. 21 Policies in an employment
manual, the court noted, can become part of the employment contract if
they are expressly included in the contract negotiations. 22 A question of
fact remained, therefore, as to whether Mr. Thompson and his employer
had contractually agreed that general policy statements in the employ-
ment manual were to be a part of the employment contract. 23
Second, the court stated that even in the absence of formal bargaining,
an employer can be bound by written promises of specific treatment in
specific situations if those promises create an atmosphere of job security
and fair treatment that induces the employee to remain on the job and not
14. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wn. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764, 768-69 (1977); Par-
ker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wn. App. 722, 725-27,649 P.2d 181, 183-84 (1982).
15. Roberts, 88 Wn. 2d at 894-96, 568 P.2d at 768-69.
16. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn. 2d 219, 221,685 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1984).
17. Id. at 221-22, 685 P.2d at 1083.
18. Id. at 223, 685 P.2d at 1084.
19. Id. at 223,685 P.2d at 1085.
20. Id. at 233-34, 685 P.2d at 1089-90.
21. Id. at 228-29, 685 P.2d at 1087.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 233-34, 685 P.2d at 1089-90.
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seek other work. 24 This exception, the court explained, is based on the
justifiable reliance the employee places on such promises. 25
Third, the court recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful dis-
charge in cases where the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public
policy. 26 This exception, the court said, applies only if the employee can
show that a legislatively or judicially recognized public policy has been
contravened. 27 A question of material fact is presented, the court con-
cluded, by Mr. Thompson's allegation that he was discharged for institut-
ing accounting practices in compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. 28
The court rejected a broader limitation on the employer's right to termi-
nate an at will employee when it refused to read an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing into all employment contracts. 29 Such an ex-
ception, the court stated, would not strike the proper balance between the
employer's interest in running the business and the employee's interest in
maintaining employment. 30
III. ANALYSIS
The employer's absolute right to terminate employees "for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong."-3' is inconsistent
with the needs and expectations of modern society. Employment and em-
ployment-related benefits are now the chief source of economic security
for most people. 32 As individuals become increasingly dependent on em-
ployment relationships for the "substance of life," 33 their interest in
maintaining those relationships must be recognized. Similarly, where the
implementation of public policy is frustrated by the employer's ability to
discharge for any reason, accomodation of the conflicting interests must
be made. The Washington Supreme Court has now modified the at will
rule so that it does not override society's interest in protecting public
values. Further modification will be necessary, however, if the em-
ployee's increased interest in job security is to be properly protected.
24. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 232. 685 P.2d at 1089.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 234. 685 P.2d at 1090.
29. Id. at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
30. Id.
31. Payne v. Western & A. R.R. Co.. 81 Tenn. 507. 519-20 (1884). overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Waiters, 132Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915).
32. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (195 1): see also Krauskopf. supra note 7. at
196.
33. See Krauskopf, supra note 7. at 196 (citing F. TANNENBAUM. supra note 32. at 9).
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A. Public Interest
Recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge furthers society's
interest in implementing its laws and important public policies. Legisla-
tively created rights, such as workers' compensation benefits, are of little
use to an employee who must risk job loss in order to secure them.34
Similarly, the enforcement of certain criminal provisions may be frus-
trated if employees fear retaliatory discharge for initiating a complaint. 35
Allowing employees to recover for discharges that contravene public pol-
icy encourages them to withstand improper demands by their employ-
ers. 36 As a result, obstruction of public policy through employer coercion
is minimized.
B. Employees' Interests
Allowing an at will employee to bring suit based on explicitly negoti-
ated job security provisions protects those employees who possess suffi-
cient bargaining power to demand such provisions. Because prior Wash-
ington law was silent on the enforceability of such provisions, it remained
possible that the at will rule precluded contractual restrictions on the em-
ployer's right to terminate. 37 The court's holding that an employee 'and
employer can contractually modify the terminable at will relationship,
however, implies that the at will rule is a rule of construction rather than a
rule of substantive limitation on contract formation. 38 This means that the
34. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1973) (fear of
being discharged will deter employees from filing claims for deserved compensation).
35. See Blades, supra note 11, at 1412 (employee probably will not risk unrecompensed loss of
job by filing complaint against employer).
36. Id. at 1414.
37. A court could have found that a contractual agreement limiting the employer's power to
discharge was incompatible with employment relationships of indefinite duration. If the employment
at will rule requires all employments of indefinite duration to be terminable at will, then the parties to
such an employment relationship cannot alter its at will character, even by mutual agreement. This
reasoning is implicit in cases holding that the absence of a specific duration of employment precludes
inquiry into the existence of contractual restrictions on the employer's power of termination. See,
e.g., Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1062-63 (Ind. App. 1980) (covenant not to
discharge at will employee for reporting dangerous employer practices unenforceable as a matter of
law); Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 79 Mich. App. 429, 262 N.W.2d 848, 851 (1977) (con-
tract of indefinite duration cannot be made other than terminable at will by provisions limiting dis-
charge), rev'd, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 328 N.E.2d 775,
779 (Ind. App. 1965) (indefinite duration of employment agreement precluded cause of action based
on express contract to limit employer's power to discharge).
38. For a more explicit holding of this type see Pine River St. Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983), which stated
The cases which reason that the at-will rule takes precedence over even explicit job termina-
tion restraints, simply because the contract is of indefinite duration, misapply the at-will rule of
construction as a rule of substantive limitation on contract formation. . . . There is no reason
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parties are now free to contractually limit the situations in which termina-
tion would be justified without altering the indefinite duration of the em-
ployment.39
The exception provides little practical protection, however, because
only a few unusually valuable employees will be able to exact such guar-
antees from their employers. 40 The majority will be offered positions on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis with no opportunity to negotiate individual provi-
sions. 41 Thus, this exception will provide a cause of action only for a
limited number of unjustly discharged employees. 42
The employee's interest in job security is furthered to a greater extent
by the court's holding that unilateral promises contained in employee pol-
icy manuals can, in appropriate situations, bind the employer. Thus. an
employee who justifiably relies on specific promises when comparing the
relative merits of various employment agreements can now recover if the
employer later fails to provide the promised benefits.4 3 This holding
why the at-will presumption needs to be construed as a limit on the parties' freedom to contract.
If the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an indefinite duration for provi-
sions of job security, they should be able to do so.
Id. at 628 (citations omitted).
39. Job security provisions that would not change the indefinite duration of the employment rela-
tionship are those that establish the bases upon which discharge would be justified, such as good
cause, unsatisfactory performance, or incompetence, or those that provide certain procedural protec-
tions against unfair discharge, such as a requirement of written warnings. review of termination deci-
sion by a supervisor, or a hearing.
40. SeeBlades, supranote ll.at 1411-12.
41. See Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee. 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1435, 1443(1975).
42. The employee's freedom to bargain for enforceable job security provisions in an employment
contract of indefinite duration should not be undermined by a requirement that the employee furmish
consideration in addition to contemplated services in exchange for those provisions. The requirement
of additional or special consideration is based on the rationale that where only the employer is obli-
gated to continue the employment relationship, and the employee reserves the right to end it at any
time and for any reason, there is no mutuality of obligation. Thus, under this reasoning. unless the
employee supplies some additional valuable consideration, the restrictions on the employer's power
to terminate cannot be enforced. For cases using this analysis. see Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co.. 627
F.2d 836. 838 (7th Cir. 1980): Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.. 332 F.2d 439. 441 (7th
Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964): Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.. 197 Minn. 291. 266
N.W. 872, 874 (1936): Forrer v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388. 153 N.W.2d 587. 590
(1967).
The modem doctrine of consideration, on the other hand, requires only that some consideration
support a promise, it does not demand equivalence in the values exchanged. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 comment c (1979): IA A. CORBIN. CONTRACTS § 152. at 13-17 (1963):
Blades, supra note 11, at 1419-20. An employee's continued labor should be ample consideration to
support both the wages paid and the employer's promises of job security. See Pine River St. Bank v.
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (Minn. 1983) (employee's continued performance is ample con-
sideration for employer's promises to pay wages and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal): Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981) (employee's rendition of
services may support employer's promise to pay wage and to refrain from arbitrary dismissal).
43. Although the court did not explicitly rely on § 90 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
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should discourage employers from making job security promises unless
they intend those promises to be binding. As a result, employees will get
a better understanding of what, if any, protection their employers actually
mean to provide. Their subsequent decisions with regard to other job op-
portunities can be made on the basis of more accurate information.
Unfortunately, this exception offers no protection to employees whose
employers do not promise any procedural protection against unfair termi-
nation. Similarly, it provides no protection for employees whose employ-
ers retain the discretionary power to modify their promises at any time. 44
Many unfairly discharged employees will therefore be left without a rem-
edy.
In the future Washington courts will encounter employees who have
been terminated unfairly and yet who, even under Thompson, cannot sur-
vive their employers' motions to dismiss. Faced with such cases, the
courts should continue to modify the outdated "American" rule.45
Thompson will not be, nor should it be, the last word.
Susan Ward
TRAcrs, this exception appears to fit within that framework. Section 90 provides that -[a] promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promi-
see or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." REsTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 90 (1979).
This section has rarely been used as a basis for recovery in at will employment situations, but there
are a few jurisdictions which have used it in related situations. See Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791,
794 (Ala. 1982) (employer who knew that employee was giving up other employment to begin new
work under new contract cannot terminate relationship at will); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) (pharmacist who gave up other employment to work for new
employer allowed to bring suit for failure to employ him); Nilsson v. Cherokee Candy & Tobacco
Co., 639 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1982) (bonus offer may have induced employee to stay and
therefore it will be enforced). See also Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 430 Vt. 114, 435 A.2d 952,
954 (1981) (discussing cause of action for discharge where employee alleged reliance on job security
provisions in employee manual, but holding evidence insufficient); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74
A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (1979) (Kupferman, J., dissenting) (employer estopped from
terminating employment except on specifically stated grounds where employee relied on such repre-
sentations).
44. The Thompson court explicitly recognized that employers could avoid liability based on
statements in policy manuals if they reserved the right to modify those statements or to exercise
discretion in their application. 102 Wn. 2d at 231, 685 P.2d at 1088.
45. The United States is among the last industrialized countries in the world to not provide gen-
eral protection against unjust dismissal. For a thorough discussion of the protection offered in other
countries see Summers, supra note 11, at 508-19.
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